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"Deemed" Security Interests in UCC Article 9:
Avoiding Traps for the Unwary
Paul Wangerin'
INTRODUCTION
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") Section 1-201(35) provides in
its detailed definition of security interests that "security interest"
means "an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures pay-
ment or performance of an obligation." Other parts of the UCC
demonstrate that two relatively distinct kinds of security interests ex-
ist. First, the UCC notes that parties to transactions can create secur-
ity interests by executing "security agreements." 2 For convenience
sake, the security interests created by security agreements can be
called "conventional" or "agreed upon" security interests. Second,
various sections of the UCC describe security interests that come into
existence by operation of law rather than by execution of security
agreements.
For convenience sake, this second group of security interests will
herein be called "deemed" security interests. The "deemed" terminol-
ogy is drawn from the analog in some Commonwealth countries to
Article 9 of the UCC. That Commonwealth analog is the Personal
Property Security Act (PPSA). 3 It is unclear why the PPSA uses the
1. Paul Wangerin teaches at the John Marshall Law School (Chicago).
2. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(73) (2015) (stating that security agreement means an agreement that cre-
ates or provides for a security interest).
3. See CUMMING, WALSH AND WOOD, PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITY LAw 90-96 (2005); see
also, Allan McDougall, Personal Properties Securities Act, Pringott Stinson (Sept. 27, 2011),
http://pigott.com.au/publications/another-super-duper-publication; see also, Brown and Gagic,
PPSA Pt 2 - Key Implications for Leases, Other "Deemed Security Interests" and Liens Univer-
sity of Adelaide Law School, University of Adelaide Law School Research Paper No. 2012-22
(Nov/Dec 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract-id=2132357. Note that in
Commonwealth countries, non-true (aka dirty lease) cases are classified as being deemed secur-
ity interests. It is important to note in this context that a number of differences exist between
the Personal Property Securities Act (PPSA) of the Commonwealth countries and Article 9. The
most important difference (for our purposes) between Article 9 and the PPSA is that the PPSA
says that ALL leases of personal property are deemed security interests. This means that under
the PPSA, ALL leases of personal property require affirmative steps for perfection of security
interests, with those affirmative steps almost always being the creation of public records, filings.
Conversely, Article 9 says that only SOME leases of personal property, "dirty" leases, are
deemed security interests. So, under Article 9 only SOME leases of personal property require
affirmative steps for perfection of interests.
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term "deemed" to describe these kinds of security interests. How-
ever, it appears that the PPSA uses the termed "deemed" for some
security interests because in some cases the PPSA itself - rather than
explicit agreement of the parties - creates security interests. 4
"Deemed" security interests could also be called "operation of law"
security interests. The contrast, of course, is to what herein are called
"conventional" or "agreed upon" security interests, interests created
by the execution of security agreements by the parties to transactions.
For several reasons, it is important to differentiate conventional
(agreed upon) security interests and "deemed" (created by law) secur-
ity interests. First, with conventional security interests, everybody in-
volved will know of the existence of the security interests because the
parties to secured transactions will have intentionally created these
interests. If you intentionally create something, you know that it ex-
ists.5 So, people or businesses that have conventional security inter-
ests in property will always know that they have secured claims that
they can assert. That is NOT the case with deemed security interests
because in lots of situations parties protected by deemed security in-
terests won't even know that they are protected by such interests.
This is because deemed security interests, as the following analysis
demonstrates, sometimes are created by operation of law rather than
by agreement of the parties 6 If people don't know they are protected
by interests, they will not know to assert those interests. Second, with
conventional security interests, all parties will know - or should know
- that in many cases (though not all cases) they must take affirmative
steps to perfect the security interests that they have, with those affirm-
ative perfection steps usually being having possession of or taking
control of property or creating public records of the interests in that
property by filing. Different things are likely to happen with deemed
security interests. Because parties protected by deemed security in-
4. CUMMING, WALSH AND WOOD, supra note 3 at 90-96; DEL DUCA, REILLY, SMITH AND
WINSHIP, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 42-65 (2011);
Claire Petereson, Deemed security interests under Personal Property Securities Act 2009, (Feb. 1,
2012), http://www.lavanlegal.com.au/index.php/publications/publicationdetail/deemed-security
interests-under-personal property-securities act 2009; Julian Lane and Laura Steele, The ef-
fect of Personal the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (cth) on the construction industry, (Apr.
30, 2012), http://www.holdingredlich.com/construction-infrastructure/the-effect-of-the-personal-
property-securities-act-2009-cth-on-the-construction-industry.
5. JAMES J. WHITE,& ROBERT S. SUMMERS, WHITE AND SUMMERS' UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 1148-49 (6th ed. 2010).
6. Conventional security interests are created by agreement of the parties to secured transac-
tions, the debtors and the creditors. Since the parties themselves will create the security inter-
ests, they must necessarily know of the existence of the interests. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(73); see
generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 22-1.
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terests sometimes don't know that these security interests exist, some
parties protected by deemed interests do not take affirmative steps to
perfect the interests when such affirmative steps are needed for
perfection.
Non-perfection of deemed security interests, in turn, can create two
distinct problems. First, people or businesses who have unperfected
deemed security interests in property are likely in many cases to lose
out in priority battles to other creditors of the possessors of the perti-
nent property, and to the bankruptcy trustees or debtors in possession
(DIP's) for the possessors of the property.7 Second, if parties pro-
tected by deemed security interests have only unperfected interests in
the property, then the bankruptcy trustees or DIP's for the protected
parties will get only unperfected security interests in the property.
Thus, in unperfected deemed interest cases, the possessors of property
might be able to keep that property away from the bankruptcy trust-
ees or DIP's for the protected parties.
I. ARTICLE 9's "DEEMED" SECURITY INTERESTS IN GENERAL
Article 9 describes "deemed" security interests in several places.
First, 9-109(a)'s description of the "Scope" of Article 9. Section 9-
109(a) lists six kinds of transactions that are included in that scope.8
Section 9-109(a)(1) describes both "conventional" security interests
7. U.C.C. § 9-317 (provides that an unperfected security interest in property is subordinate to
a judicial lien on the pertinent property). So if a judicial lien is obtained on property before the
property is encumbered with a perfected security interest, that judicial lien has priority. This is
important because § 544(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code says that as of the bankruptcy petition
date, the trustee of the bankrupt (or the debtor-in-possession (DIP)), has the rights and powers
of: a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the commencement of the case, and
that obtains, at such time and with respect to such credit, a judicial lien on all property on which
a creditor on a simple contract could have obtained such a judicial lien, whether or not such a
creditor exists. In other words, the trustee (or DIP) is a hypothetical lien creditor that enjoys the
protections of U.C.C. § 9-317. So if a secured creditor is perfected as of the petition date, its
security interest trumps the DIP, and the estate benefits from the secured creditor's collateral
only after the secured creditor is repaid. However, if the secured creditor is not perfected as of
the petition date, then the DIP prevails and the secured creditor shares pro rata with other
unsecured creditors. Deemed security interests in property, in turn, allow claimants who have
earlier-in-time deemed interests in property to have priority over later-in-time claimants to the
property, including later-in-time bankruptcy trustees or DIPS. In some cases, the deemed inter-
est holders need do nothing at all to have priority over later-in-time claimants because the
deemed interests perfect automatically. In other cases, the deemed interest holders must take
affirmative steps to perfect their interests, steps involving taking possession of or control over
property or filing.
8. Id. § 9-109(a).
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and some "deemed" interests.9 Parts (2) - (6) of 9-109(a) explicitly
describe only "deemed" security interests.10
In particular, section 9-109(a) provides that Article 9 applies to:
(1) a transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a security inter-
est in personal property or fixtures by contract;
(2) an agricultural lien;
(3) a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promis-
sory notes;
(4) a consignment;
(5) a security interest arising under Section 2-401, 2-505, 2-711(3),
or 2A-508(5), as provided in Section 9-110;
(6) a security interest arising under Section 4-210 or 5-118.11
Section 9-102(a)(73), defining "secured party," continues the
description of "conventional" and "deemed" security interests. Note
in particular how the six parts of 9-102(a)(73) parallel - though not
perfectly - the six parts of 9-109(a). Note in particular how Sub (F) in
9-102(a)(73) is completely different from anything in 9-109(a). Note
also that sub (A) explicitly addresses only "conventional" security in-
terests, i.e. interests created by security interests, whereas its parallel
in section 9-109(a)(1) describes both conventional and deemed secur-
ity interests. Everything after (a) is "deemed."
In particular, section 9-102(a) (73) says that Secured Party means:
(A) a person in whose favor a security interest is created or pro-
vided for under a security agreement, whether or not any obligation
to be secured is outstanding;
(B) a person that holds an agricultural lien;
(C) a consignor;
(D) a person to which accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles,
or promissory notes have been sold;
(E) a trustee, indenture trustee, agent, collateral agent, or other
representative in whose favor a security interest or agricultural
lien is created or provided for; or
(F) a person that holds a security interest arising under Section 2-
401, 2-505,2-711(3), 2A-508(5), 4-210, or 5-118.12
References to deemed security interests also occur in 1-201(35)'s
definition of "security interest." 1 3 Note in particular section 1-
201(35)'s reference (in the last sentence) to the question of whether
"leases" are or are not security interests. Section 1-201(35) of the
U.C.C. states:
9. Id. § 9-109(a)(1). The "regardless of its form" language includes some deemed interests.
10. Id. § 9 109(a)(2)-(6).
11. Id. § 9-109(a).
12. U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(73).
13. Id. § 1-201(35).
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"Security interest" means an interest in personal property or fix-
tures which secures payment or performance of an obligation. "Se-
curity interest" includes any interest of a consignor and a buyer of
accounts, chattel paper, a payment intangible, or a promissory note
in a transaction that is subject to Article 9... [Exclusion Omitted]
The retention or reservation of title by a seller of goods notwith-
standing shipment or delivery to the buyer under Section 2-401 is
limited in effect to a reservation of a "security interest." Whether a
transaction in the form of a lease creates a "security interest" is de-
termined pursuant to Section 1-203.14
Finally, section 9-309, the section of the UCC which describes secur-
ity interests that perfect upon attachment (that perfect "automati-
cally"), also contributes some references to deemed security interests,
including some references that are in parallel with the lists in 9-109(a)
and 9-109(a)(73). Again, the pattern of description of conventional
and deemed interests is the same as already seen. Section 9-309 starts
by referring to a category of security interests that clearly are conven-
tional interests (interests in consumer goods).15 But section 9-309
then shifts and thereafter describes categories of security interests that
clearly are deemed. 16 Note also that section 9-309 once again omits
reference to leases.
14. Id. § 1-201(35).
15. Id. § 9-309(1) ("a purchase-money security interest in consumer goods, except as other-
wise provided in Section 9-311(b) with respect to consumer goods that are subject to a statute or
treaty described in Section 9-311(a)").
16. Id. § 9-309: The following security interests are perfected when they attach:
(1) a purchase-money security interest in consumer goods, except as otherwise pro-
vided in Section 9-311(b) with respect to consumer goods that are subject to a statute or
treaty described in Section 9-311(a);
(2) an assignment of accounts or payment intangibles which does not by itself or in
conjunction with other assignments to the same assignee transfer a significant part of
the assignor's outstanding accounts or payment intangibles;
(3) a sale of a payment intangible;
(4) a sale of a promissory note;
(5) a security interest created by the assignment of a health-care-insurance receivable
to the provider of the health-care goods or services;
(6) a security interest arising under Section 2-401, 2-505, 2-711(3), or 2A-508(5), until
the debtor obtains possession of the collateral;
(7) a security interest of a collecting bank arising under Section 4-210;
(8) a security interest of an issuer or nominated person arising under Section 5-118;
(9) a security interest arising in the delivery of a financial asset under Section 9-206(c);
(10) a security interest in investment property created by a broker or securities
intermediary;
(11) a security interest in a commodity contract or a commodity account created by a
commodity intermediary;
(12) an assignment for the benefit of all creditors of the transferor and subsequent
transfers by the assignee thereunder; and
(13) a security interest created by an assignment of a beneficial interest in a decedent's
estate.
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The various descriptions and definitions of deemed security inter-
ests mentioned earlier indicate, collectively, that "deemed" security
interests can be divided into two relatively distinct groups. First, as
will be demonstrated below, some deemed security interests - particu-
larly those involving transfers of payment rights, agricultural liens,
some retention-of-title cases, some consignments and some leases of
personal property - require affirmative conduct for perfection, with
that affirmative conduct usually being filing. These are the deemed
security interests that principally present "traps for the unwary," with
those traps usually being the failure to take affirmative steps to per-
fect the security interests. Further, and also as demonstrated below,
other deemed security interests perfect upon attachment, i.e. automat-
ically. The traps for the unwary here are different. Here the problem
is that people or businesses protected by the deemed interests may not
even know that the interests exist and thus may not assert their rights
under the interests.
II. "DEEMED" SECURITY INTERESTS THAT REQUIRE AFFIRMATIVE
CONDUCT FOR PERFECTION
As noted earlier, some deemed interests can only be perfected by
the taking of affirmative perfection steps. Other deemed interests per-
fect automatically. We'll look first at the deemed interests that need
affirmative conduct for perfection. We'll look later at the deemed in-
terests that perfect automatically.
A. Transfers of Payment Rights
Generally speaking, people and businesses that deal in transferring
payment rights create conventional security interests when they trans-
fer the payment rights, including when they "sell" the payment rights.
Since the parties who deal in this kind of finance usually knowingly
create security interests in many cases, perfection of the knowingly
created interests usually follows as a matter of course.17
Sections 9-109(1), and (3), however, tell us that it doesn't really
matter whether the parties to payment rights transfers create conven-
17. Interestingly, the characters in transfer of payment right cases are sort of backwards from
the norm in Article 9. In normal Article 9 cases, the sellers of things take security interests from
the buyers to secure future payments by the buyers. With payment rights, however, the "buyers"
of the payment rights, or the parties comparable to buyers, take security interests. That's back-
wards. But, actually it's not backwards. The way to think about transfers of payment rights is
that the transferors are akin to borrowers (of immediate cash or other rights) and that the trans-
ferees are akin to lenders of the immediate cash (or other rights). The transferees, therefore,
who are akin to lenders, take security interests in the transferors' property, notably the right that
the transferors have to receive future payments.
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tional security interests in connection with the transfers.18 Even if the
parties to payment right transfers don't create conventional security
interests, Article 9 itself creates deemed security interests. It's in
these latter cases - where Article 9 creates deemed interests - that
trouble can arise. If the transferees of payment rights don't know that
Article 9 has created deemed security interests in connection with
these transactions, those transferees won't know that they must per-
fect the security interests. And if those transferees don't perfect the
interests in the payment rights, then those transferees will likely lose
out to other creditors (of the transferor of the rights) and the bank-
ruptcy trustees (of the transferors).
Article 9 draws transactions involving transfers of payment rights
into itself for an important reason. In many cases, the transferors of
the payment rights collect payments from account debtors and then
forward those collected payments on to the transferees of the pay-
ment rights. Further, the transferors in these cases generally do NOT
create a public record of the transactions. This is because in many
cases the transferors do not realize that they are creating security in-
terests by these transfers. Rather, the transferors usually think that
they are simply selling the payment rights, or assigning them or pledg-
ing them. Because of these two things, unscrupulous transferors of
payment rights sometimes transfer the same payment rights several
times, first to Bank 1, for instance, and then later to Bank 2, and still
later to Bank 3. Article 9 solves this problem by requiring the initial
transferees of payment rights to perfect security interests in the rights
and probably to do that perfection by filing.19 The filing then gives
later potential lenders notice of the existing security interests of the
first lenders. (We'll see some exceptions later.)
The perfection requirement for the deemed security interests in the
payment rights also protects the initial transferees against bankruptcy
trustees that might take over for the transferors. Absent the deemed
interests, and the perfection of them, the bankruptcy trustees might
well get the rest of the payments that are due to the transferors.
The good news for transferees of payment rights in these "deemed"
security interest cases is that in an important segment of this group of
deemed interests - the segment that includes payment rights that are
expressed in physical documents - the interests will perfect when the
creditors take possession of or gain control over the physical docu-
ments. So, in these cases, the creditors will take the necessary affirma-
18. U.C.C. § 9-109(1) and (3).
19. Id. § 1-201(36)-(37), § 9-102(a)(61), § 9-102(a)(72), § 9-102(a)(73), § 9-109(a)(1), § 9-
109(a)(3), § 9-309(3)-(4), § 9-313(a)-(b).
2015] 85
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tive steps to bring about perfection without even knowing that they
are taking these affirmative steps. A creditor doesn't have to know
that he or she is perfecting a security interest in a payment right by
taking possession of or gaining control over a payment right. The
creditors just take these affirmative steps as a matter of course.
The other good news is that perfection of security interests in some
situations involving transfers of payment rights occurs automatically.
We'll get to those automatic perfection situations later.
B. A Quick Word about Agricultural Liens
For completeness sake, this analysis of deemed security interests
that require affirmative steps for perfection, must talk briefly about
agricultural liens. 20 Reference to these kinds of deemed security in-
terests is quick because anecdotal evidence suggests that these in-
stances do not create traps for the unwary. This is so, it seems,
because the rules about these kinds of transactions have been in oper-
ation in the pertinent industries for many, many years. Further, expe-
rience suggests that almost all creditors and debtors in the pertinent
industries know about these rules. Thus, for example, anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that almost everybody who deals with farm financing
knows that agricultural liens exist in many farming interests and also
knows that these interests must be perfected, usually by filing.
Agricultural liens are a hybrid. Some attributes of agricultural liens
connect these liens to other kinds of liens, principally statutory and
judicial liens. Mostly importantly, agricultural liens are like other
kinds of liens because agricultural liens come into existence by opera-
tion of law rather than by agreement of the parties. However, some
attributes of agricultural liens also connect agricultural liens to secur-
ity interests and particularly to deemed security interests. 21 Most im-
portantly, agricultural liens, like security interests, are fully effective
only if they are perfected. Further, though some differences exist be-
tween the way Article 9 deals with security interests and the way Arti-
cle 9 deals with agricultural liens, a great deal of overlap exists
between Article 9's approach to security interests and Article 9's ap-
proach to agricultural liens.
As noted repeatedly, Article 9 treats agricultural liens as if they are
deemed security interests, deemed interests that must be perfected
20. Agricultural liens are handled under U.C.C. § 9-109(2).
21. Id. § 9-109(a), for example, the section of Article 9 that describes the "scope" of Article 9,
explicitly states in subpart (2) that agricultural liens are within the scope of Article 9. In addi-
tion, 9-102(73) explicitly notes in subpart (B) that "secured party" includes a person that holds
an agricultural lien.
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through filing, possession or obtaining control. These ideas and rules,
in turn, seem to be well known in the farm finance industry. Thus,
there really are no "traps for the unwary" in this context. Everybody
seems to know what they have to do to be fully protected. So, nothing
more needed be said about this kind of deemed security interest.
C. A Quick Word about 2-401 Retention-of-Title Transfers
Subsection (5) of 9-109 indicates that "deemed" security interests
come into existence by operation of law in some "retention-of-title"
cases. In an important way, retention-of-title instances are similar to
agricultural liens. Deemed security interests most certainly come into
existence in retention-of-title cases, as they most certainly do with ag-
ricultural liens. But, it seems that almost everybody in the pertinent
industries knows that these interests come into effect in some situa-
tions and also knows that these interests must be perfected.
A cryptic phrase in section 2-401 states the retention-of-title idea,
and introduces this quick analysis: "Any retention or reservation by
the seller of the title (property) in goods shipped or delivered to the
buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of a security interest." 22
The back story to the rule just stated comes out of the auto finance
industry.23 For a time in the fairly distance past, automobile manufac-
turers wanted to make credit sales of cars to automobile dealers but
did NOT want to be bothered with having to file financing statements.
So, for a time, automobile manufacturers entered into agreements
with car dealers in which the dealers got physical possession of cars
but the manufacturers retained title to the cars until the dealers had
completed making payments on the cars. Since the manufacturers re-
tained title, the manufacturers believed that they weren't taking secur-
ity interests in the cars but rather retaining ownership of the cars.
Thus, the manufacturers believed that they did not have to file financ-
ing statements.
As we will see later, the automobile finance strategy just described
- which was used a goodly long while ago - is similar to the finance
strategy currently used in connection with so-called "non-true leases"
and in connection with so-called "finance consignments." In non-true
22. Id. § 2-401.
23. See Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank v. Warren Lepley Ford, Inc., 12 Pa. D. & C. 2d 351
(1957); see also, Rolf B. Johnson, A Uniform Solution to Common Law Confusion: Retention-of-
title under English and U.S. Law, 12 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, 99, 118
(1994); Robert Laurence, Some Practical Advice About Taking Security Interests in Gemstones,
Accompanied by a Theoretical Discussion of the Negotiability of Goods, New and Used, 2004
ARK. L. NoTEs 75, http://lawnotes.law.uark.edu/wp-content/uploads/Laurence-Some-Practical-
Advice-About-Taking-Security-Interests-in-Gemstones-Arkansas-Law-Notes-2004.pdf.
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lease cases, "lessors" transfer possession of property to "lessees" but
do not transfer ownership of the property. So, in theory, "lessors" in
dirty lease instances do not have to perfect security interests in the
transferred property (because they retain ownership of the property).
Likewise, in finance consignment cases, "consignors" transfer posses-
sion of property to "consignees" but do not transfer ownership of the
property. So, in theory, "consignors" in finance consignment in-
stances do not have to perfect security interests in the transferred
property (because they retain ownership of the property).
Courts long ago realized that retention-of-title transactions created
a serious "ostensible ownership" problem. That's so because in reten-
tion-of-title cases, it appeared to the world that the dealers owned the
cars whereas in fact, and at least in connection with title, the manufac-
turers owned the cares. This appearance issue made it likely that un-
scrupulous dealers could deceive third party lenders and purchasers.
Because of the foregoing, courts realized long ago that retention-of-
title transactions actually were credit sales with retention by the auto-
mobile dealers of security interests in the cars. The courts so ruled.24
Those court rulings, in turn, became the cryptic sentence in section 2-
401 stating, "Any retention or reservation by the seller of the title
(property) in goods shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in
effect to the reservation of a security interest." 25 As we will see later,
these court decisions in the past in the automobile industry, and the
deemed security interest idea in retention-of-title instances under 2-
401 are today being echoed in non-true lease and finance consignment
cases.
It is clear that section 2-401's rules about retention-of-title situa-
tions involve creation of deemed security interests. It is also clear that
these deemed security interests must be perfected by filing, possession
or obtaining control over the pertinent property. The fact is, however,
that everybody in the pertinent finance industries seems to know
about the retention-of-title rules and everybody in the pertinent fi-
nance industries seems to know that the security interests created in
this context must be perfected by filing, possession, or obtaining con-
trol. So, there really are no "traps for the unwary" in this context.
24. See generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 4-12, § 6-1(b).
25. U.C.C. § 2-401.
[Vol. 14:79
"DEEMED" SECURITY INTERESTS IN UCC ARTICLE 9
D. Leases True and Non-True (aka" Dirty Leases")
Leases are transfers of the right to possession and use of property in
return for a payment. 26 Although the term "lease" usually is used by
laypeople in connection with discussions of real property, leases are
very common in connection with personal property. That's so because
tax and accounting rules frequently make it sensible for commercial
actors to lease property rather than to purchase it outright.
Careful analysis quickly reveals the likelihood of ostensible owner-
ship and priority problems with "leases" of personal property. As-
sume, for example, that Seller offers to sell a large piece of machinery
to Buyer for $12K, payable in 12 monthly installments of $1K.
Buyer's accountant, however, tells Buyer that it would make tax and
accounting sense for Buyer to "lease" the machine from Seller. Buyer
and Seller then draw up paperwork in which Buyer offers to "lease"
the machine for a year from Seller, and to pay "rent" of $1K per
month for a year. Is this transaction actually a lease, or is it actually a
disguised credit sale? Now also note this. It is very common in "lease"
cases for the parties to transactions explicitly to state in paperwork for
the transactions that the transferors of the property (the "lessors") at
all times retain ownership of the property.27 "Title" to the property,
the paperwork also frequently states, does NOT transfer to the trans-
feree (the lessees). Title remains with the lessor. Does the wording
in the documents matter?
The UCC deals with the problem just described by differentiating
between "true leases" on the one hand and "non-true" (aka "dirty
leases" or "lease purchase agreements" or "purchase leases") on the
other hand.28 True leases actually are leases, according to the UCC,
and are treated as such. Non-true leases, however, are NOT leases
and are NOT treated as such. Rather, non-true leases actually are
disguised sales (with retentions of security interests). Because non-
true leases are disguised sales (with retentions of security interests),
they are subject to Article 9. Therefore, to be protected, non-true
"lessors" must file financing statements about the subject property.
There is good news and bad news in connection with the UCC's
discussion of the methodology for differentiating true leases from
non-true leases. The bad news is that the UCC's formal method for
differentiating between these kinds of transactions is complex. The
26. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2A-103; see also U.C.C. § 1-203; see, e.g., WHITE & SUMMERS, supra
note 5, at 1148-1247.
27. See U.C.C. § 1-203.
28. Id.
2015] 89
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good news is that a very simple test often is the only thing necessary to
use to differentiate these different transactions.
The UCC proposes a complicated and elaborate methodology for
differentiating between true leases (on the one hand) and non-true
leases (on the other hand). UCC section 1-203 starts the true lease /
dirty lease differentiation process by stating that the determination of
lease or security interest status is based on the facts of the individual
case. Section 1-203 then immediately goes on with what is sometimes
called the "bright line" test or the "mandated" security interest cases.
Under this test, a determination is first made as to whether a "lease"
is or is not terminable before the end of the "lease" term. If the
"lease" is NOT terminable before the end of the term, then the
"lease" is a disguised sale with a security interest if one of four addi-
tional elements exist:
(1) the original term of the lease is equal to or greater than the
remaining economic life of the goods; (2) the "lessee" is bound to
renew the "lease" for the remainder of the economic life of the
goods or is bound to become owner of the goods; (3) the "lessee"
has the option to renew the lease for the remaining economic life of
the goods for no additional consideration or nominal additional
consideration upon compliance with the "lease" terms; (4) or, the
"lessee" has the option to become the owner of the goods for no
additional consideration or nominal additional consideration upon
compliance with the "lease" agreement.29
If determination of true lease / dirty lease status can't be made with
the "bright line" test just described, section 1-203 says determination
of this status should be made in light of the facts of the case. That test
is as follows:
A transaction in the form of a lease creates a security interest if the
consideration that the lessee is to pay the lessor for the right to pos-
session and use of the goods is an obligation for the term of the
lease and is not subject to termination by the lessee, and: (1) the
original term of the lease is equal to or greater than the remaining
economic life of the goods; (2) the lessee is bound to renew the
lease for the remaining economic life of the goods or is bound to
become the owner of the goods; (3) the lessee has an option to re-
new the lease for the remaining economic life of the goods for no
additional consideration or for nominal additional consideration
upon compliance with the lease agreement; or (4) the lessee has an
option to become the owner of the goods for no additional consider-
ation or for nominal additional consideration upon compliance with
the lease agreement.30
29. Id. § 1-203(b).
30. Id.
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In connection with the factual analysis of these points, 1-203(c) de-
scribes some transactions that do NOT create security interests even
though these transactions have lease-looking elements. Finally, sec-
tions 1-203(d) and (e) provide some definitions including definitions
of "nominal payments," "remaining economic life," and "reasonably
predictable."
As noted above, there also is good news in the context of differenti-
ating between true and non-true (aka dirty) leases. In many cases, a
determination of whether a transaction is a true lease on the one hand
or a non-true lease on the other hand can be made simply by looking
at the residual value of the property at the end of the "lease" term. If
the property that is subject to a "lease" likely will have substantial
residual value at the end of the lease term, and if, therefore, the "les-
sor" of the property likely will take back the property at the end of
the term, then the transaction is a true lease. (Think of leases of
apartments and automobiles. Leases for these kinds of property have
substantial residual value. So, the lessors in these cases almost cer-
tainly will take back the property at the end of the lease term.)
One last point about leases, true and non-true (dirty) must yet be
made. In cases wherein the parties to transactions are unsure as to
whether the transactions are true leases or non-true leases, careful
commercial actors can simply do a "protective compliance" (aka a
"protective filing").31 Protective compliance can't hurt because sec-
tion 9-505(b) says that filing or compliance with Article 9 is not "of
itself a factor in determining whether the collateral secures an obliga-
tion." 32 But protective compliance can certainly help. Protective
compliance can help because if a judge later rules that the "lease"
actually is a non-true lease, then the protective compliance will give
the "lessor" priority in the "leased" priority over other creditors of the
"lessee" and over the "lessee's" bankruptcy trustee. Bottom Line:
Compliance with Article 9 (filing) is easy and cheap; litigation is diffi-
cult and expensive.
E. Consignments (Shop, Finance and Quasi)
Several different kinds of "consignments" exist, some of which
kinds are included in Article 9's definition of consignments and some
of which are excluded from Article 9's definition. The first kind of
consignment is the kind that lay-people (and, probably, lots of law-
yers) think of when they hear the word consignment. This is a con-
31. Id. § 9-505(b).
32. Id.
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signment where people give goods, often old or used goods, to
merchants that hold themselves out as being in the business of selling
the property of others. Often the stores involved in these kinds of
consignments outright call themselves "consignment shops."33 Inter-
estingly, Article 9 does NOT include these kinds of consignments in its
definition of consignment. Indeed, section 9-102(2)(A)(iii) explicitly
EXCLUDES these kinds of consignments from its definition of con-
signments. 34 Nevertheless, for want of better terminology and be-
cause, candidly, so many lay people and lawyers think of these kinds
of consignments as being consignments, we'll call these kinds of con-
signments "shop consignments" (though, again, they are flat out ex-
cluded from Article 9's definition of consignments).
The second kind of consignment, which is the only kind included in
Article 9's definition of consignment, is described in section 9-102(20)
as the following:
"Consignment" means a transaction, regardless of its form, in which
a person delivers goods to a merchant for the purpose of sale and:
(A) the merchant: (i) deals in goods of that kind under a name
other than the name of the person making delivery; (ii) is not an
auctioneer; and (iii) is not generally known by its creditors to be
substantially engaged in selling the goods of others; (B) with respect
to each delivery, the aggregate value of the goods is $1,000 or more
at the time of delivery; (C) the goods are not consumer goods im-
mediately before delivery; and (D) the transaction does not create a
security interest that secures an obligation.35
As noted earlier, the foregoing kind of consignment is the only kind
of transaction that is a "consignment" in Article 9. However, because
there is such widespread use of the term "consignment" for other
kinds of transactions, we'll use the term "finance consignment" to de-
scribe these transactions and to differentiate them from what we are
called "shop" consignments. Remember: "Shop consignments" are
what lay people (and probably a goodly number of lawyers) think of
when they hear the word "consignment."
33. U.C.C. § 9-102 (2); see John Hicinbothem, Consignments, Creditors' Rights and U.C.C
Section 2-326, 9 B.C.L. REV. 62 (1967), available at http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edubclr/vol9/
issl/3; Richard W. Duesenburg, Consignment Distribution Under the Uniform Commercial Code:
Code, Bankruptcy, and Antitrust Decisions, 2 VAL. U. L. REV 227 (1968), available at http://
scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol2/iss2/2; see, e.g., Bernstein and Berkeley, Consignments: My, How
You've Changed!, (Sept. 2003), available at http://bernsteinlaw.com/publications-list/consign
ments-my-how-youve-changed/; see also, Nathan, infra note 45; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note
5, § 22.
34. U.C.C. § 9-102(2)(A)(iii).
35. Id. § 9-102(20).
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We'll come later to a third kind of "consignment," again a kind
NOT included in Article 9's definition of consignment. This third
kind of consignment is sometimes called a "quasi consignment" or a
"tolling agreement" or a "customer owned equipment / inventory
arrangement."
A preliminary word must quickly be said by way of introduction to
this analysis of deemed security interests in the consignment context.
Recall the back story for the retention-of-title deemed security inter-
ests that was discussed earlier herein. For a period of time a long
while ago, automobile manufacturers wanted to sell cars to dealers on
credit but didn't want to have to bother filing financing statements.
So, long ago, automobile manufacturers prepared paperwork for their
sales of cars to dealers that showed that the automobile manufacturers
retained title to the cars even though the cars were in the possession
of the dealers. This financing scheme, the manufacturers thought,
made it unnecessary for the manufacturers to file financing statements
on the sold cars. As noted earlier, the courts long ago saw through
this retention-of-title financing scheme. So, this particular financing
scheme has long since been discredited in connection with basic sales.
Nevertheless, watch for echoes of this retention-of-title financing idea
in connection with the following analysis of leases.
Let's start with what we are calling "shop consignments." (Again:
"Shop consignments" is NOT Article 9 terminology. Indeed Article 9
explicitly excludes these kinds of transactions from its definition of
consignment.) With shop consignments, it is clear that the transac-
tions are closer to bailments than to sales. That's because with shop
consignments, as with bailments (and as NOT with sales), title to
property does NOT transfer from the consignor (JMLS) to the con-
signee. Rather, with shop consignments, as with bailments but as
NOT with sales, title to property stays with the consignors. 36 The only
thing that transfers with shop consignments is the right to possess the
property for future sale. Further, everybody who deals with consign-
ment shops knows that the shops themselves do not own the goods.
It's kind of like bailments: Everybody knows that carriage and ware-
housing companies don't own the property that they possess.
But now consider this new situation. And while considering this
new situation, recall again the now-discredited "retention-of-title" fi-
nance scheme used long ago by automobile manufacturers:
36. Id. § 2-401, of course, states that title to property is not particularly important in connec-
tion with Article 2 transactions. Here, however, we just using transfer of title in a non-technical
sense.
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Assume that Manufacturing Co. has manufactured a new item,
10,000 smallish-sized toys. Manufacturing Co. primarily sells its
toys through Retailer, Inc. In connection with this new toy, how-
ever, Retailer Inc. doesn't want to take the risk of the toys not sell-
ing. So, Retailer proposes a "sell or return" transaction. Under a
sell or return transaction like this, Retailer will take delivery of the
toys but will NOT pay Manufacturing Co. for them. Further, under
this a deal, Retailer will not take ownership of the toys. Rather,
with a sell or return deal, Retailer will take the toys from Manufac-
turing and attempt to sell them. If Retailer sells the toys, or some of
them, it will reimburse Manufacturing for the toys and will deduct
from the reimbursement a fee for itself. This is the "sell" part of a
sell or return transaction. However, if Retailer does NOT sell some
of the toys, or any of them, Retailer will just return the unsold toys
to Manufacturing. Retailer can do this because, as stated earlier,
Retailer never took ownership of the toys. Further, and just as im-
portantly, in connection with the unsold toys, Retailer will make no
payment whatsoever to Tacky for the toys.
Sell or return transactions 37 such as the one just described are sur-
prisingly common. In many cases, for example, the books / magazines
in bookstores are the subjects of sell or return transactions. The book
stores do NOT own the books / magazines. Rather, the bookstores
only have the right to possess the books / magazines for further sale.
Sell or return transactions also are common in the fashion industry.
Retailers in these cases do NOT purchase the products from the man-
ufacturers. Rather, the retailers in these cases take only the right to
possess the property for future sales. Ownership stays with the manu-
facturers. In addition, sell or return transactions are common in con-
nection with seasonal goods - Christmas / Halloween decorations,
for example. If the retailers sell the seasonal products, they reimburse
the manufacturers (minus a fee). But if the seasonal products do
NOT sell, the retailers just return them to the manufacturers and
make no payment at all. Finally, sell or return deals are common in
situations where manufacturers are launching new or unconventional
products. If retailers don't want to take a risk of non-sale with these
new or unconventional products, the retailers sometimes insist on sell
or return deals with the retailers. If the new or unconventional prod-
ucts sell, the retailers pay a fee to the manufacturer for them. If the
products do not sell, the retailers just return the products to the
manufacturers.
For various reasons, the UCC calls sell or return transactions like
the ones just described "consignments" or even "true consign-
37. Id. § 2-326; see also, U.C.C. § 9-102(2), § 2-105, § 2-401.
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ments." 38 The UCC uses this consignment terminology even though
sell or return transactions are totally different from the kinds of con-
signments that most people think of when the term consignment is
used, namely, "shop consignments."
Note carefully now an important difference between what we are
calling "shop consignments" on the one hand and what we are calling
"finance consignments" (or just "consignments" or "true consign-
ments" or "sell or return transactions") on the other hand. The envi-
ronment of possession of the property in the two different kinds of
consignment situations suggests different things about ownership and
non-ownership of the property. When property is consigned to con-
signment shops, third parties who see the property in the physical pos-
session of the shops will immediately notice that the property is
owned by somebody other than the shop consignees. That's because
the shops themselves usually state as much on the tags, or generally on
signage in the shops. So no knowledgeable third-party lender or
third-party purchaser will assume that property in a "consignment
shop" is owned outright by the consignee. Rather, third-party lenders
or third-party purchasers will in these cases assume, correctly, that the
property belongs to somebody other than the consignment shop. Con-
versely, when property is consigned to finance consignees, third par-
ties who see the property in the physical possession of the finance
consignees are NOT likely to think that the property has been "con-
signed" to the consignees. Rather, in finance consignment cases, third
parties who see property in the possession of finance consignees are
likely to think that the finance consignees outright own the property,
probably as "inventory." 3 9 So, again, the appearance of ownership of
the property involved is different between shop consignments and fi-
nance consignments.
An important question now arises. Why should we care about the
difference between shop consignments (usually of used furniture, jew-
elry, clothes, antiques) and finance consignments (usually of new
books / magazines, clothes and seasonal goods, etc.)? The answer is
straight-forward.
The UCC treats shop consignments as similar to bailments. 40 That
treatment has several ramifications. First, consignors in shop consign-
ment situations do NOT have to comply with Article 9 to protect
themselves in connection with payment for or return of the consigned
38. U.C.C. § 2-326, § 9-102, § 9-317.
39. Inventory in Article 9 is goods that are held for sale or that is used up quickly in the
manufacture of other goods. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(48).
40. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 1148-1247.
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property. That's because shop consignors always retain ownership of
the property. Second, if shop consignors declare bankruptcy, bank-
ruptcy representatives for the shop consignors will likely get bank-
ruptcy priority against the consigned property even though the
property is in the possession of the consignees. 41 Third, if shop con-
signees declare bankruptcy, the bankruptcy representatives for the
shop consignees will likely NOT get bankruptcy priority against the
consigned property.42
Conversely, the UCC says exactly the opposite about what we are
calling finance consignments.43 Finance consignments, the UCC says,
are much closer to credit sales than to bailments.44 The reasoning for
this probably involves the appearance of ownership in finance con-
signment cases. Recall that in finance consignments situations, 3rd
parties who come to the physical locations of the finance consignees
are likely to think that property that is possessed by the finance con-
signees (the retailers) is actually owned by those finance consignees.
If third parties think that - particularly third parties who represent
banks and finance entities that are considering the possibility of mak-
ing second loans to the finance consignees - are likely to think that
finance consignees are much more solvent than they actually are.
Assume, for example, that Manufacturing Co. finance consigns
10,000 plastic toys to Retailer and that Retailer takes possession of the
toys. Assume further that an officer from Second Bank, from which
bank Retailer wishes to get a second loan, comes to Retailers shop.
The bank officer will see the 10,000 toys and assume that Retailer
owns them as inventory. "You've got plenty of inventory," the bank
officer might then say to Retailer. "So, you're good for the [second]
loan." Because of the foregoing, the UCC treats finance consignments
as much closer to sales than to bailments.
It should quickly be said that it is very common in both shop and
finance consignment cases for the parties to the transactions explicitly
to state in the paperwork for the transactions that the transferors of
the property (the consignors) at all times retain ownership of the
property.45 Title to the property, the paperwork frequently goes on to
41. Bankruptcy representatives for the shop consignors will likely get bankruptcy priority
against the consigned property because ownership of the property has never moved from the
consignors to the shop consignees and because bankruptcy trustees only get the status of lien
creditors in connection with property owned by the bankrupt. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1999).
42. Id.
43. U.C.C. § 9-102.
44. Id.
45. Bruce S. Nathan, Bailment or Consignment: It Makes a Difference!, BUSINESS CREDIT,
Nov./Dec. 2006, at 26.
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state, does NOT transfer to the transferee (the consignees). Notwith-
standing explicit statements in the paperwork about non-transfer of
ownership, the why-it-matters ideas described above control. With
shop consignments, the consigned property is treated as if it is owned
by the shop consignors. The shop consignees only have the right to
possess the property for future sale, which is consistent with the termi-
nology in the paperwork. Conversely, with finance consignments, the
consigned property is treated as if it is owned by the consignees rather
than by the consignors even if the paperwork says exactly the oppo-
site. Because of that, the consignors in finance consignment situations
must protect themselves by complying with Article 9.
The UCC's rules about finance consignments potentially can gener-
ate serious problems in connection with the four inter-related why-it-
matters ideas mentioned repeatedly herein. First, with finance con-
signments, consignors will not necessarily know that they have se-
cured claims.46 So, consignors will NOT always know that they can
pursue such claims in court or otherwise. Second, with finance con-
signments, consignors may NOT know that they will have to take af-
firmative steps to perfect their security interests unless the interests
are of a type where interests perfect automatically. Third, with fi-
nance consignments, if debtors declare bankruptcy, finance consignors
will be ahead of debtors' bankruptcy representatives, likely depending
on whether the consignors took or did not take affirmative steps to
perfect their security interests. This is because finance consignors by
operation of law liens against the "consigned" property. 47 Fourth, and
finally, with finance consignments, if consignors (as opposed to debt-
ors) declare bankruptcy, then the debtors' bankruptcy representatives
will or will not gain possession of the creditors' deemed interests, usu-
ally depending on whether the consignors took or did not take affirm-
ative steps to perfect the interests.48
A third kind of transaction must now be described, a kind of trans-
action that is sometimes called a "quasi consignment." 4 9 These kinds
of transactions sometimes also are called "tolling" arrangements or
"customer owned inventory / equipment" arrangements."
Superficially, quasi consignments are NOT Article 9 consignments
because they do NOT involve the transfer of property for future sale.
However, Comment 14 to 9-102 clearly indicates that some consign-
46. It is likely that the consignors will NOT necessarily have played a role in the creation of
their security interests.
47. U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(4); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 22-2.
48. U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(4); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 22-2.
49. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 22-5.
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ment transactions involve transfers with two or more purposes, future
sales AND one or more other things. (The specific language in this
comment is that the goods are delivered to the consignee "for another
purpose as well [as future sale], such as milling or processing.") If the
transactions involve future sales AND other things, the transactions
clearly do fit into Article 9's seemingly strict definition.50
The definition of "consignment" requires that the goods be deliv-
ered "to a merchant for the purpose of sale". If the goods are deliv-
ered for another purpose as well, such as milling or processing, the
transaction is a consignment nonetheless because a purpose of the
delivery is "sale". On the other hand, if a merchant-processor-bailee
will not be selling the goods itself but will be delivering to buyers to
which the owner-bailor agreed to sell the goods, the transaction
would not be a consignment.5 '
Quasi-consignments - aka "tolling" agreements 52 as in toll road or
toll bridge - usually involve the transfer of raw materials from compa-
nies that own those raw materials to other companies that will process
the raw materials. 53 The owners / suppliers of the property then pay
the processors. These transactions also sometimes involve the transfer
of heavy equipment or expensive machinery from companies that own
that equipment or machinery to companies that will use that equip-
ment or machinery to manufacture things for the owners of the equip-
ment or machinery. Again, the owners / suppliers of the equipment
pay the processors for the work done by the processors.
White and Summers give this helpful summary of the variety of
these kinds of transactions:
The parties' plans for goods in these cases are varied and uncertain.
In some cases, the owner has the right to get the goods back; in
others the processors are to ship the goods to third parties at the
owners' direction; in still others, the possibility exists that the
processors will sell the goods and remit the proceeds. None are
50. Id.; see also U.C.C. § 9-102, comment 14.
51. U.C.C. § 9-102, comment 14.




56D3E2-F367-4151-9054-0C3860758F4A&ibSearch.x=0&ibSearch.y=0&; see also Nathan, supra
note 45; Deborah Thorne, Bailment vs Sale: Another View, Business Credit, (April 2007), http://
www.btlaw.com/files/BCApr07 Thorn 1.pdf; see also George R. Hirsch, Mysteries Of Uniform
Commercial Code Article 9: Security Interests In Commingled Goods, THE METROPOLITAN COR-
PORATE COUNSEL (Februrary 9, 2012, 10:50 AM), http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/
17575/mysteries-uniform-commercial-code-article-9-security-interests-commingled-goods.
53. The term "tolling agreement" is sometimes also used to describe agreements whereby the
period of a statute of limitations is extended by agreement of the parties to a potential lawsuit.
The present analysis has no interest in that other use of the tolling agreement term.
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pure consignments or pure bailments; all have some qualities of
each.54
The paperwork for quasi-consignments almost always explicitly
states that the parties to the agreements agree that ownership of the
property at all times stays with the transferors, the owners / suppliers.
The transferees, the paperwork says, the processors, have only the
right to process the property. The idea of this language in the
paperwork, of course, is to make these transactions look like bail-
ments and only bailments. That's because if the transactions are bail-
ments, compliance with Article 9 is NOT required.
But what if the paperwork for quasi-consignments uses the word
"sale," as in the processor can sell the processed property to third par-
ties on behalf of the owners / suppliers? Because of the "sale" lan-
guage, a court might classify this transaction as a consignment. In that
case, the transaction is drawn into Article 9 and the owner / supplier
must comply with Article 9 to be protected from other claimants to
the property, especially bankruptcy trustees or DIP's.5 5 Failure to
perfect a security interest in these cases will cause the owners / suppli-
ers to lose out in priority conflicts with other creditors, including the
bankruptcy trustee or DIP for the processor. Or what if the
paperwork calls the quasi-consignment a "consignment?" If the trans-
action actually is a consignment, then the transaction is drawn into
Article 9 and failure to perfect a security interest in the transferred
property will cause the owner / supplier to lose priority in the trans-
ferred property, potentially allowing the bankruptcy trustee or DIP
for the processor to get the transferred property. This is exactly what
the issue was in some cases recently addressed by some bankruptcy
commentators. 56
One last point must yet be made about consignments, shop and fi-
nance and quasi. (Again, according to Article 9, the only transactions
54. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 1168.
55. JAMES J. WHITE, AUTO SUPPLIER INSOLVENCIES & BANKRUPTCIES: ISSUEs FOR SUPPLI-
ERS AND CUSTOMERS OF FINANCIALLY TROUBLED AUTO SUPPLIERS, 79 6th ed. (2006); see also
GMAC Business Credit LLC v Ford Motor Co. 271 B.R.534 (Bankr. E. D. Mich. 2002), aff'd 100
Fed. Appx 404 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that no bailment of inventory under Michigan law but a
sale); General Motors Corp. v. Bristol Industries Corp., 1981 WL 138044 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1981), rev'd on other grounds, 690 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating that a tolling agreement consti-
tuted a sale of goods and not a bailment); In Re Etch-Art-Inc., 65 B. R. 183 (Bankr. D. R. I.
1986); Morton Booth Co. v. Tiara Furniture Inc., 564 P.2d 210 (Okla. 1977); Litwiller Mach. &
Mfg. Inc. v NBD Alpena Bank, 457 N. W. 2d 163 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990); see also In re Ge-
orgetown Steel Co. LLC, 318 B.R. 352 (Bankr. D. S.C. 2004) (holding no bailment where goods
provided by one person to manufacture for fabrication and sale to third parties).
56. See, Nathan, supra note 49; see also DeborahThorne, Bailment vs. Sale: Another View,
Bus. CREDIT 2 at 3, (Apr. 2007), http://www.btlaw.com/files/BCApr07-Thorn_1.pdf; see also
Hirsch, supra note 52.
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that actually are consignments are transactions herein called "finance
consignments.") 57 In cases wherein the parties to transactions are un-
sure as to whether the transactions are shop or finance consignments
or whether they are quasi-consignments, or whether they are some-
thing else entirely, careful commercial actors should simply do a "pro-
tective compliance" (aka a "protective filing"). As noted earlier,
protective compliance can't hurt because section 9-505(b) says that
filing or compliance with Article 9 is not "of itself a factor in deter-
mining whether the collateral secures an obligation." But protective
compliance can certainly help because if a judge later rules that the
consignment is a finance consignment rather than a shop consignment,
then the protective compliance will give the consignor priority in the
property over other creditors of the consignee and over the con-
signee's bankruptcy trustee. Bottom Line: Compliance with Article 9
(filing) is easy and cheap; litigation is difficult and expensive.
A quick summary of the foregoing ideas addressed can now be
made. In a number of different instances, Article 9 creates "deemed"
security interests by operation of law. Some of these interests, such as
the ones already discussed, require affirmative steps for perfection.
Hence, lack of knowledge of these interests by the protected parties
will likely cause those protected parties to fail to perfect these inter-
ests. The principal instances here involve transfers of payment rights,
agricultural liens, some retention-of-title cases, leases (true and dirty)
and consignments (shop, finance and quasi). In the agricultural lien
and retention-of-title cases, everybody involved with the financing
seems to know about the perfection issue. So, mistakes don't seem to
be too common in those cases. Serious problems come up, however,
in connection with transfers of payment rights, leases and the various
different kinds of consignments.
III. DEEMED SECURITY INTERESTS THAT
AUTOMATICALLY PERFECT
Deemed security interests that perfect automatically come in three
distinct varieties. First, some deemed security interests come into ex-
istence in Article 2 cases, notably, sellers' shipments under reservation
and buyers' rejection or revocations of acceptance.5 8 Second, in some
cases deemed security interests that involve transfers of payment
rights automatically perfect.5 9 Third, a "motley lot" of other deemed
57. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 22-4.
58. U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(5); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 22-2.
59. U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 22-2, § 22-6.
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interests - with no logical connection between these different kinds of
deemed interests - also perfect automatically. 60
Recall now that the "traps for the unwary" that exist in connection
with deemed security interests that perfect automatically are different
from the traps for the unwary that exist in connection with deemed
security interests where perfection requires affirmative steps. With
the affirmative steps kinds of deemed interests, the trap is that people
or businesses protected by these interests will not know of the exis-
tence of the interests and thus may not take the affirmative steps to
perfect the interests. With deemed security interests that perfect auto-
matically, the problem is only the first just mentioned (because perfec-
tion in these cases happens automatically). With automatic perfection
of deemed interests, the problem is that the possessors won't know of
the interests and thus might not even assert their rights under the
interests.
A. Deemed Security Interests in Several Article 2 Instances
The lists of deemed interests in 9-109(a) and 9-102(a)(73) do NOT
reference 9-110 when those lists mention some Article 2 and 2A secur-
ity interests. But, the connection between 9-110 and Article 2 deemed
security interests is obvious. 9-110 states that a "security interest aris-
ing under Section 2-401, 2-505, 2-711(3), or 2A-508(5) is subject to this
article." Those sections in Articles 2 and 2A are explicitly mentioned
in the lists of deemed security interests in 9-109(a) and 9-102(a)(73).
Two instances of section 9-110 security interests involve deemed se-
curity interests that automatically perfect. These two instances are dis-
cussed immediately below. However, another instance where Article
2 creates deemed security interests - instances involving retention-of-
title cases - involves interests that must be perfected by filing, posses-
sion or obtaining control of the collateral. The retention-of-title in-
stance was discussed earlier in this analysis, when the analysis
discussed deemed interests that must be perfected by the taking of
affirmative perfection steps.
Not uncommonly, writings that exist between sellers and buyers in
connection with sales of goods say that the sellers retain ownership to
goods "identified to the contract" 61 until some condition occurs, with
that condition frequently being payment made by the buyers. Fur-
ther, and again not uncommonly, sellers deliver sold goods to carriers
60. U.C.C. § 9-309; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 1195.
61. Identification to the contract means that sellers have identified specific goods that are the
subject of particular contracts.
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and in exchange get bills of lading from the carriers. Sometimes these
bills of lading are "negotiable" (meaning that the bills of lading can
easily be transferred from one person or business to another). In
other cases, the bills of lading are "non-negotiable" (meaning that the
bills of lading do NOT transfer easily from one party to another).
The following question frequently arises in these cases: Who - the
sellers or the buyers - has rights to disputed goods that have been (a)
identified to the contracts but still are in the physical possession of the
seller or (b) have been delivered to carriers in exchange for bills of
lading or that are (c) in the possession of buyers after rightful rejec-
tions or rightful revocations of acceptance. In the first case just men-
tioned, the seller has possession of the property. In the second case, a
carrier or warehouse has the property. Finally, in the third case, the
buyer has the property but has indicated that the property should re-
turn to the seller.
The reasons that these who-has-rights-to-the-property questions
come up when sellers have the property are multi-fold. First, not un-
commonly, goods that have been identified to contracts but still re-
main in the possession of the sellers are damaged or destroyed. Who
bears the risk of that damage or destruction, the sellers or the buyers?
Second, not uncommonly, goods that are in the possession of carriers
are damaged or destroyed. Again, who bears the risk of that loss, the
sellers or the buyers? Finally, it is not uncommon for sellers or buyers
who are parties to sales transactions to file for bankruptcy after sellers
have identified goods to contracts or delivered goods to carriers but
before the buyers get the goods. Whose bankruptcy trustees in these
cases gets the goods, the sellers' bankruptcy trustees, or the buyers'
bankruptcy trustees, or neither?
Historically, Article 2 addressed these issues (and related ones) by
focusing on "passage of title" to property. If title to property had not
passed, sellers had the pertinent rights in the property. Conversely, if
title had passed, then buyers had rights in the goods. The UCC no
longer relies so heaving on "passage of title" ideas. Rather, the UCC
now has very specific rules for dealing with these who-has-the-rights
issues in very specific cases, rules such as those outlined in sections 2-
50562 and 1-203.63 These very specific rules differ from one kinds of
property to another. 64
62. U.C.C. § 2-505 deals with situations involving seller's shipments under reservation.
63. U.C.C. § 2-103 deals with "leases" of personal property.
64. See, e.g., S. HARRIS, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY (Foundation Press, 5th
ed. 2011).
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The UCC deals with seller-side issues in these contexts in sections 2-
401 and 2-505. 2-401 starts things off by suggesting that passage of
title is the controlling idea.65 However, section 2-401 quickly notes
that its own general passage of title ideas apply only when more spe-
cific rules in the UCC apply.66 Thus, section 2-401 immediately sends
us to section 2-505. 2-205 then provides the specific rules for dealing
with the property. The section 2-505 rules, in turn, note that in some
instances, sellers get "security interests" in the good.67 Since the "se-
curity interests" described in section 2-505 most assuredly are NOT
conventional security interests, these interests are "deemed" security
interests.
Note now the perfection issue, or, better said, the perfection non-
issue. In many situations covered by sections 2-401 and 2-505, the to-
be-protected parties will not know that deemed security interests have
come into existence to protect them. And why should they know this?
These are sales transactions, not secured transactions. The good news,
however, is that Article 9 says that the deemed security interests in
this context perfect automatically. 68 So, as soon as the deemed inter-
ests come into existence, they are perfected. Since the to-be-pro-
tected parties need do nothing at all to perfect the interests, it matters
nothing, at least at this stage, that the to-be-protected parties don't
know the interests exist.
Though the foregoing analysis repeatedly referenced section 2-401,
the foregoing did NOT note that section 2-401 itself describes deemed
security interests. The omission was not casual. The deemed security
interests that section 2-401 itself describes require affirmative perfec-
tion steps. So, those particular deemed interests were covered earlier.
A comparable deemed security interest issue also arises on the of
buyer side of buyer / seller transactions and is dealt with in section 2-
711(3). A lessee's version of this problem is dealt with in section 2A-
508(5).
Not uncommonly, buyers (or lessees) "reject" delivered goods when
the buyers determine that the goods failed to conform to the require-
ments of the contracts. Further, it is not uncommon for buyers / les-
sees to "revoke acceptance" of goods when the buyers discover after
acceptance that the goods don't conform to the contracts. In both of
these cases, the buyers are likely to be in possession of the goods even
though the buyers have rejected the goods or have revoked accept-
65. U.C.C. § 2-401.
66. Id.
67. Id. § 2-505.
68. Id. § 9-109.
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ance of them. Who - the buyers or the sellers - has rights to goods
that are in the possession of buyers but that are the subject of rejec-
tions or revocation of acceptances by the buyers? Again, the reasons
that these who-has-the-rights questions matter are these. First, not
uncommonly, goods that have been rejected or that are the subject of
revocations but that nevertheless are in the possession of buyers are
damaged or destroyed. Who bears the risk of that damage or destruc-
tion, the sellers or the buyers? Second, it is not uncommon for sellers
or buyers who are parties to sales transactions to file for bankruptcy
when buyers are in possession of goods that have been rejected or that
are subject to revocations of acceptance. Whose bankruptcy trustees
in these cases gets the goods, the sellers' bankruptcy trustees, or the
buyers' bankruptcy trustees, or neither?
Article 2 addresses these buyer side issues in sections 2-401, 2-
711(3), and 2A-508(5). 69 Again, section 2-401 announces a "passage
of title" idea. However, section 2-401, to repeat, says its own passage
of title rules apply only when the UCC doesn't have more specific
rules for particular cases.70 Section 2-711(3) gives us the more specific
rules. Section 2-711(3) states that buyers who have possession of
goods after rightful rejection of the goods or after reasonable revoca-
tion of acceptance of the goods, deemed security interests in the goods
for any payments made on their price and for expenses reasonably
incurred in their inspection, transportation, care and custody.7 ' Again,
these security interests clearly are NOT "conventional" security inter-
ests. Hence, section 2-711(3) security interests must be "deemed" se-
curity interests. These deemed security interests potentially put the
buyers of the goods ahead of other creditors in connection with the
goods. These interests also potentially put the buyers ahead of the
sellers' bankruptcy trustees.
Note now the perfection issue, or, better said, the perfection non-
issue. In many situations covered by Article 2 deemed security inter-
ests, the to-be-protected parties will not know that deemed security
interests have come into existence to protect them. And why should
they know this? These are sales transactions, not secured transac-
tions. The good news, however, is that Article 9 says that the deemed
security interests in this context perfect automatically. So, as soon as
the deemed interests come into existence, they are perfected. Since
the to-be-protected parties need do nothing at all to perfect the inter-
69. Id. § 2-401, § 2-711(3), § 2A-508(5).
70. U.C.C. § 2-401.
71. Id. § 2-711(3).
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ests, it matters nothing, at least at this stage, that the to-be-protected
parties don't know the interests exist.
Because the Article 2 deemed security interests just describe perfect
automatically, perfection issues are NOT likely to present much in the
way of problems here. Further, the bankruptcy issues repeatedly men-
tioned already in this analysis, will be handled the same way that
bankruptcy issues are handled for conventional security interests. So,
really, only one of the four inter-related why-it-matters ideas repeat-
edly described herein will potentially cause problems. When creditors
don't know that they have security interests, those creditors will not
know that they can assert secured claims.
One additional thing deserves mention here. In some cases, the
facts of the cases generate considerable ambiguity as to whether Arti-
cle 2 creates, and then automatically perfects, deemed security inter-
ests. Sometimes this ambiguity will cause courts to conclude that no
security interest exists in the particular case. In other situations, this
ambiguity will cause courts to determine that security interests have
come into existence (by attachment). In both of these cases, court
rulings could leave some creditors incompletely protected.
Interestingly, Article 9 itself supplies a simple solution to this does-
it-apply / does-it-not apply ambiguity issue. Article 9 authorizes what
are sometimes called "protective" filings.72 Protective filings allow
parties to transactions who aren't sure whether a security interest ex-
ists at all in connection with a transaction, or who aren't sure whether
they must take affirmative steps to perfect security interests, to file a
financing statement about the security interests involved "just to be
safe." Since section 9-505(b) says that filing or compliance with Arti-
cle 9 is not "of itself a factor in determining whether the collateral
secures an obligation," 73 protective filings have no negative conse-
quences. It can't hurt to file. And it potentially can help. Bottom
Line: Compliance with Article 9 (filing) is easy and cheap; litigation is
difficult and expensive.
B. Deemed Security Interests in Some Cases of Rights to
Receive Payments
As noted earlier, Article 9 says, essentially, that all transfers of pay-
ment rights create security interests in the payment rights. 74 If the
parties to the transfers explicitly state that the transfers create security
72. Id. § 9-505(b).
73. Id.
74. Id. § 9-109(a)(1).
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interests, then the security interests created in these transactions are
conventional security interests and normal rules about security inter-
ests apply. However, if the parties to transfers of payment rights do
NOT explicitly state that the transfers create security interests in the
payment rights, or explicitly state that they are NOT security interests,
then the security interests created by these transfers are deemed se-
curity interests.
Note now the perfection rules for security interests involving trans-
fers of payment rights. First, if the security interests created by trans-
fers of payment rights are conventional security interests, meaning if
the parties to transactions explicitly state that the transactions are
meant to create security for payment or performance, then the to-be-
protected parties in these transactions must take affirmative steps to
perfect the interests.75 The affirmative steps usually will involve filing.
Second, as demonstrated earlier herein, deemed security interests
that arise in connection with various different kinds of transfers of
payment rights must generally be perfected by filing.76 We addressed
those issues above. Third, in some cases security interests in payment
rights in some contexts perfect automatically.77 Creditors need NOT
take affirmative steps to perfect in these cases.
Our focus now turns to the fact that 9-309 says that the deemed
interests in a long list of different kinds of payment rights cases per-
fect automatically.78 In these cases, the protected parties need NOT
take affirmative steps to perfect the interests that the law has created
for them. Rather, as soon as the deemed interests come into exis-
tence, they are perfected.
Perhaps the most important example here is deemed security inter-
ests that are the result of "casual or isolated" transfers of payment
rights. 79 In these casual or isolated cases, the transferees of the pay-
ment rights simply can't be expected to know that Article 9 has cre-
ated security interests to protect them and that they, the casual or
isolated transferees have to take affirmative steps to perfect those in-
terests (which they probably don't even know exist).
75. See U.C.C. § 9-308-316; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 22-4.
76. See U.C.C. § 9-308-316; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 22-4.
77. See U.C.C. § 9-308-316; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 22-5.
78. The list of situations where security interests perfect automatically includes "isolated and
casual" transfers of payment rights, transfers of health care receivables, lottery winnings, and
beneficial interests in decedents estates. More importantly, the list of automatic perfection cases
involves "sales" of payment rights and all kinds of transfers of payment intangibles. These cases
encompass the huge number of deemed security interests that come into existence in connection
with securitizations and debt warehousing.
79. The "casual and isolated" language is from U.C.C. § 9-309, Comment 3.
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But, the "casual and isolated" deemed interests are NOT the only
payment right instances that provide automatic perfection. Rather,
other examples also exist. For example, for various reasons, the bank
lobbyists did not want deemed security interests to exist at all in con-
nection with "sales" of payments rights (as opposed to transfers of
such rights to create security) and any kinds of transfers of payment
intangibles.80 And the bank lobbyists certainly didn't want an affirma-
tive perfection steps requirement in these contexts. The compromise
ultimately was that deemed security interests come into existence in
these banking contexts but that these deemed interests perfect auto-
matically (so that banks don't have to take affirmative steps to perfect
the interests).
Several additional instances also need mention. These too involve
automatic perfection of deemed security interests.81 First, section 4-
210 says that a collecting bank has a security interest in an item and
any accompanying documents or the proceeds of either:
(1) in case of an item deposited in an account, to the extent to which
credit given for the item has been withdrawn or applied;
(2) in case of an item for which it has given credit available for with-
drawal as of right, to the extent of the credit given, whether or not
the credit is drawn upon or there is a right of charge-back; or
(3) if it makes an advance on or against the item.
Second, 5-118 states that an issuer or nominated person has a secur-
ity interest in a document presented under a letter of credit and any
identifiable proceeds of the collateral to the extent that the issuer or
nominated person honors or gives value for the presentation. Again,
in both of these cases, 9-309 says that the deemed security interests
perfect automatically.
Finally, section 9-309(7) through section 9-309(13) gives us a list of
additional instances where deemed security interests - mostly in pay-
ment rights or things related to payment rights - perfect automati-
cally. These instances do not display any kind of pattern. In fact,
Professors White and Summers refer to them as "a motley lot of trans-
actions." 82 Rather, these remaining cases probably are just a random
collection of situations where lobbyists for financial entities who deal
with particular kinds of transactions wanted those transactions (1) to
create security interests in property and (2) wanted the interests to
perfect automatically. Chances are that a major part of the thinking
80. Payment intangibles are a hybrid kind of payment rights, a kind that usually occurs in the
context of securitization and loan warehousing.
81. See U.C.C. § 9-309(7)-(8).
82. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 1195.
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here is that the creditors in these transactions want to have priority
over the bankruptcy trustees / DIPs of the debtors and to get that
priority without filing. A mere listing of the components of this last
group of automatically perfecting deemed security interests is suffi-
cient. As noted, section 9-309(7) through section 9-309(13) really is
just a "motley lot:"
(7) a security interest of a collecting bank arising under Section 4-
210;
(8) a security interest of an issuer or nominated person arising
under Section 5-118;
(9) a security interest arising in the delivery of a financial asset
under Section 9-206(c);
(10) a security interest in investment property created by a broker
or securities intermediary;
(11) a security interest in a commodity contract or a commodity ac-
count created by a commodity intermediary;
(12) an assignment for the benefit of all creditors of the transferor
and subsequent transfers by the assignee thereunder; and
(13) a security interest created by an assignment of a beneficial in-
terest in a decedent's estate.
Overall, therefore, the following can be stated about "deemed" se-
curity interests that perfect automatically. First, in several Article 2
instances, notably, sellers' shipments under reservation and buyers'
rightful rejection or revocation of acceptance, sellers and buyers have
deemed interests in the pertinent goods. These deemed interests usu-
ally protect sellers and buyers from the bankruptcy trustees of the op-
posite parties to the contracts. Because the protected parties in these
cases are unlikely to know that they have deemed interests in the par-
ticular property involved, Article 9 says that these deemed interests
perfect automatically. Second, although the general rule is that
deemed security interests in transferred payment rights usually must
be perfected by the taking of affirmative steps, Article 9 gives auto-
matic perfection to deemed interests that come into existence in some
payment right cases. The most important of these cases involve "cas-
ual or isolated" payment right transactions. But automatic perfection
also occurs in some cases involving collecting banks, issuers of letters
of credit and a "motley lot" of other kinds of transactions (in some of
which cases the creditors are unlikely to know that deemed security
interests protect them).
CONCLUSION
In summary, a couple points need emphasis. Article 9 refers, inter
alia, to two relatively distinct kinds of security interests. Some secur-
ity interests - called "conventional" security interests herein - are
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created by security agreements and come into existence through a
two-step process of attachment and perfection. Second, some security
interests - called "deemed" security interests herein (borrowing ter-
minology from the law in some Commonwealth countries83 ), are cre-
ated by operation of law rather than by security agreements of parties
to transactions.
In some of these deemed security interest cases, creditors must take
affirmative steps to perfect their interest, with those steps usually in-
volving filing. Failure to perfect in these cases will potentially cause
these creditors to lose out in priority battles to other creditors, and,
perhaps more importantly, to the bankruptcy trustees or DIPS of the
transferees of the property. These are the principal "traps for the un-
wary" that deemed security interests create. Other deemed security
interests perfect automatically. Thus, creditors do NOT need to take
affirmative steps to perfect these deemed interests. The traps for the
unwary here are simply the fact that creditors protected by these auto-
matically perfected interests will not know that they are so protected
and, therefore, will not assert rights that they have but don't know
that they have.
One last thing, a repetition of what has been stated repeatedly
herein, must again be mentioned. In all of the security interests cases
just mentioned, the smart plan is for potentially protected parties to
do "protective compliances" (aka "protective filings"). Protective
compliance can't hurt because 9-505(b) says that filing or compliance
with Article 9 is not "of itself a factor in determining whether the
collateral secures an obligation." 84 But protective compliance cer-
tainly can help. If judges later rule that the transactions generated
deemed security interests, or if judges later rule that affirmative steps
were required to perfect various security interests that were created
by the transactions, then protective compliances with Article 9 will
give the potentially protected parties protection against non-perfec-
tion mistakes. Bottom Line (Again): Compliance with Article 9, in-
cluding protective compliance, is easy and cheap. Litigation is difficult
and expensive.
83. See CUMMING, WALSH AND WooD, supra note 3 at 90-96; see also, McDougall, supra note
3.
84. U.C.C. § 9-505(b).
1092015]

